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Shang-Jin Wei 
China was one of  the fastest growing economies in the 1980s. The average 
annual growth rate of (inflation-adjusted) GDP for China from 1980-90 was 
9.5 percent. The corresponding growth rate for the world as a whole was 3.1 
percent (World Bank 1992, 221,. table 2). The growth rate for China in 1992 
was 12.6 percent. 
The rapid growth in China is obviously related to its relentless (but not nec- 
essarily consistent) pursuit of economic reform, which has unleashed produc- 
tive forces previously suppressed by  rigid central planning. One particularly 
important component of the reform program is China’s open door policy. In- 
deed, China is literally a textbook example of  export-led growth.’ 
The modest objective of this paper is to ascertain answers to two questions. 
First, what is the contribution of exports and foreign investment to rapid indus- 
trial growth in  China? Second, is  there  any  spillover effect from exports 
or foreign investment? Because the 12-year reform period is relatively short, 
it is difficult to do statistical analysis based on the limited number of aggre- 
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1. In a widely used textbook on international economics (Krugman and Obstfeld 1991, 247). 
the authors wrote that Chinese economic growth in the  1980s “amounted to a vimal economic 
miracle-and  a classical demonstration of the potential of export-oriented industrialization.” 
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gate observations. One small innovation of  this paper is to employ city-level 
data.2 
To  preview the conclusions of the paper, I have found some clear evidence 
that during 1980-90 more exports are positively associated with higher growth 
rates across Chinese cities. In the late 1980s, the contribution to growth comes 
mainly from foreign investment. Furthermore, the contribution of  foreign in- 
vestment comes in the form of technological or managerial spillovers across 
firms as opposed to an infusion of new capital. Finally, the superb growth rates 
of  coastal areas relative to the national average can be entirely explained by 
their effective use of exports and foreign investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.1, the process of 
opening to the outside world is briefly reviewed. Section 3.2 discusses a mini- 
malist conceptual framework that will be used to assess statistically the contri- 
bution of the open door policy to rapid Chinese growth. In section 3.3, the two 
data sets are described. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 present and interpret the statistical 
results from the two samples. Section 3.6 concludes the paper. 
3.1  Opening Up the Chinese Economy in the 1980s 
To  assess the contribution of the Chinese open door policy, it is useful to 
review briefly the path China has taken in this dire~tion.~  In 1978, China was 
ranked thirty-second in the world in export volume. In  1989, it became the 
world’s thirteenth largest exporter. Its share of world trade almost doubled dur- 
ing this period. Between  1978 and  1990, the average annual rate of  trade 
expansion was above 15 percent, more than three times higher than that of total 
world trade (Lardy 1992). 
This change in the degree of outward orientation is truly remarkable, partic- 
ularly when one considers China’s strong aversion to trade and foreign invest- 
ment before the ref~rm.~  China’s  trade regime before 1978 was an extreme 
version of  import substitution. Many official statements made this very ex- 
plicit. One official in 1955 said that “the purpose of importing . .  . is to lay the 
foundation of China’s industrial independence, so that in the future China can 
produce all of the producer goods it needs and will not have to rely on imports 
from the outside” (Lardy 1992). 
A few characteristics highlight the nature of  the prereform trade regime: 
2. There are 434 and 74 cities in the two data sets. After a draft of this paper was completed, I 
learned that Wang (1993) was using data on 231 cities and Wang and Mody (1993) have used data 
on seven coastal provinces to assess Chinese growth. 
3. For an excellent discussion of the prereform trade system during 1950-78  and the evolution 
of  trade reform in the 1980s, see Sung (1991), Lardy (1992). and Cheng (1992). The  first book 
has also expertly delineated the important role of Hong Kong in China’s drive to open up to the 
outside world. The following discussion of the evolution of China’s trade regime is based mainly 
on Lardy (1992). 
4. Kamm (1989) has described vividly the eerie feeling of doing export and import business 
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(1) The state monopolized trade through state trade corporations. No firm or 
individual could export or import goods without the intermediation of one of 
these corporations. (2) There was no close link between the world and domes- 
tic prices of tradable goods. A state trade corporation purchased imports at the 
world price and sold them domestically at a price determined by a state plan, 
which typically did not vary with world price or domestic demand. Similarly, 
a state trade corporation purchased exportable goods from domestic firms at a 
plan-dictated price and sold them at the world market price. (3) Foreign ex- 
change was tightly controlled by the state. All foreign exchange resulting from 
exports was retained by the state. All imports had to be part of  a state plan to 
be materialized. 
In 1979, China decided to open up to the outside world. Since then, a few 
important steps have been taken in this effort: (1) The government has decen- 
tralized decision making regarding exports and imports to local governments 
or regional foreign trade corporations. (2) A series of special economic zones 
and coastal open cities have been designated for the purpose of  stimulating 
exports and attracting foreign investment. (3) Administrative restrictions on 
exports and imports have been replaced by  tariffs, quotas, and licensing. (4) 
Controls on foreign exchange have been loosened over the years, particularly 
for foreign-investedmanaged firms. 
How open has China become after a decade of reform? A common measure 
of openness is the ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GNP. If one uses the 
market exchange rate to convert China’s GNP to U.S. dollars, China displays a 
phenomenal increase in the trade-GNP ratio, from about 9.7 percent in 1978 
to 26.8 percent in 1989 (Lardy 1992, 151). 
However, as Lardy points out, there are two problems with this ratio. First, 
the ratio is not useful for a cross-country comparison. Smaller countries tend 
to have higher ratios even if their government policies are equally favorable (or 
unfavorable) to trade.5  Another problem is that using the market exchange rate 
to convert Chinese GNP may  overstate Chinese openness since it underesti- 
mates China’s true GNP. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another manifestation of the open door 
policy. FDI was virtually nonexistent in the decades preceding 1979. In 1983, 
the flow of  foreign investment was a mere U.S. $1.7 billion. It increased to 
$5.3 billion in 1988, and to $11.4 billion in 1991. Accumulated FDI from 1979 
to 1992 (calculated without depreciation) reached $34.5 billion.6 
In terms of the source of FDI, Hong Kong is by far the absolutely dominant 
supplier. Between 1984 and 1990, Hong Kong’s share of  FDI was above 50 
5. To control for the contribution of size or geographic location determinants to trade volume, 
one may  want  to use a gravity model to establish a norm of  trade  volume (e.g., Frankel  1992; 
Frankel and Wei  1993). Then, the deviation from the norm can be used as a more accurate measure 
of openness. 
6. Almanac of  China’s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (Hong Kong: China Resources 
Trade Consultancy, 1990); People’s Daily (Overseas edition) February 1992, May 31, 1993. 76  Shang-Jin Wei 
percent for every single year except 1985 when the share was 48.9 percent. Of 
course, of  Hong Kong investment, a fraction is Taiwanese capital in disguise 
for political reasons, and another fraction is mainland Chinese capital in dis- 
guise to take advantage of the preferential treatment of  foreign investment in 
China. But the bulk of it is genuinely from Hong K~ng.~ 
Japan is ranked second in terms of its share in total FDI in China, although 
it is much less significant than Hong Kong (Japan’s shares in  1989 and 1990 
were 11 and  13 percent). In third place is the United States, which follows 
Japan closely. 
Foreign investment takes several forms. Equity joint ventures, which were 
an insignificant part of FDI in the early 1980s, accounted for 50 percent of all 
FDI in 1990. There are also contractual joint ventures, wholly foreign-owned 
ventures, and joint explorations (mainly in offshore oil explorations). Their 
shares in FDI in 1990 were 18 percent, 18 percent, and 7 percent, respectively. 
“Compensation trade,” in which foreign firms provide machines or product 
designs to Chinese firms and obtain part of  the output as payment, is also 
counted as FDI in Chinese statistics, although it is really a kind of barter trade. 
Compensation trade has become less and less important over time. Its share in 
FDI has declined from about 20 percent in the early 1980s to less than 5 per- 
cent in 1990 (Kueh 1992). 
One serious obstacle to China’s attracting foreign investment is its imperfect 
property and contract laws. Legal enforcement is weak in spite of the laws that 
exist in written form. So far, however, foreign investment has been reasonably 
robust for two reasons. First, low factor costs and tax concessions can often 
ensure high returns even in a short time. Second, overseas Chinese can use 
their connection and familiarity with “Chinese culture” (whatever that is) to 
get things done without the procedural protection of the laws. The latter is one 
important reason for Hong Kong’s prominence as a source of foreign invest- 
ment. There is little doubt that foreign investment from other than ethnic Chi- 
nese would have been greater had there been a better and more transparent 
legal environment for business, and improving the creation, and particularly 
the enforcement, of property and contract laws is important for the continued 
success of China’s open door policy. 
Foreign investment, like foreign trade, increasingly exposes Chinese work- 
ers and  firms  to  international managerial and  technological standards and 
knowhow. It increases the efficiency, not only of those firms that receive for- 
eign investment or that are under foreign management, but also of those do- 
mestic firms that interact with foreign-investedmanaged firms through various 
channels (positive externality), as I will show statistically later. It may  also 
promote growth by alleviating the shortage of domestic savings or foreign ex- 
change.8 
7. See Kueh (1992), who also provided a comprehensive review of FDI in China and particularly 
8. Wei  and Fan  (1993), however, fail to find statistical support for th~s  view using the  same 
in its coastal areas. 
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3.2  A Conceptual Framework 
In this section, a minimalist model is set up to guide the subsequent empiri- 
cal investigation. Let a generic firmj  in city k operate with the following pro- 
duction function: 
‘k]  =  AkflLkJ)  AkJzkJ3 
where Lkl denotes its labor input and A, is the productivity shift parameter. 
JI.)  is a twice-differentiable concave function. Capital stock is left out of the 
production function because no city-level data are available. 
Assume that the firm maximizes its profit, taking all prices as given. That is, 
it maximizes 
In the equilibrium, the firm’s growth is governed by 
Assume that 
AkJ = A, A,, 
where A, and A, are the national and city-level productivity  component^.^ Note 
that for simplicity I have assumed away firm-specific productivity shift. This 
is to focus attention on those activities whose benefits spill over to other firms 
or other cities. The growth rate of  productivity will then be the sum of the 
growth rates of the two components. 
Assume further that 
Zb =  f(LkJ)  = L“  kJ‘ 
Then, 
‘kj  Lkj 
Let g denote any growth rate. The growth rate of city k can be expressed as 
a weighted average of the growth rates of all the firms in the city, that is, as 
- 
gk  c  ‘k,gb - c  ‘k]gAk, + c  ‘kJgzI;, 
= gAn + gAk +  gLk, 
where sb is firmj’s share in city k’s output. 
We  will focus on a few variables that affect the productivity increase. Let 
gAk =f(FD1k?  Expk7  ‘M)t  Hk)9 
9. This specification is similar to that in Glaeser et al. (1992). 78  Shang-Jin Wei 
where FDI, and Exp, are foreign direct investment in city k and exports by city 
k, respectively, Y, is the initial size of the industrial sector in city k, and H, is 
the stock of human capital in city k. 
Assuming a linear version of A*),  we  have the following equation as the 
basis of our subsequent statistical analyses: 
where e, is a city-specific error term. The error term is assumed to be indepen- 
dent across cities, but can have different variances. 
Having the initial size of an industrial sector, Y,,  infi-) is a crude way  to 
capture the notions of  increasing returns to  scale as  advanced by  Romer 
(1986), or of learning by  doing as emphasized by  Young (1991). The larger 
the initial scale of production, the more productive future production will be. 
FDI is a primary mechanism for the transfer of technology from developed 
countries to developing countries. In the context of China, it is also a primary 
mechanism for the transfer of foreign management methods and worker disci- 
pline into the country. Exports expose exporting firms to the rigor of  inter- 
national competition as well as to new techniques in marketing and processing. 
FDI can enter the regressions in one of  two ways, as a share of the city’s 
total investment or in absolute scale. If the role of FDI is merely as an infusion 
of  capital into a city-that  is, the technology it brings with it does not spill 
over to other firms in the city-then  its contribution to the city’s growth will 
be proportional to its share in the city’s total capital stock. I will call this as an 
“intensity effect.” On the other hand, there may  be a substantial amount of 
spillover across firms through interactions of workers or managers between the 
foreign-ownedmanaged firms and those that do not receive foreign investment 
directly. The actual channels of  spillover may include dinner table conversa- 
tions of friends or family members who work in different firms. The physical 
presence of foreign firms in the city facilitates the transfer. Suppose all domes- 
tic firms that do not receive foreign investment directly always obtain a con- 
stant fraction of  the benefits  (in terms of  extra growth rates) that foreign- 
invested firms obtain and suppose further that foreign-invested  firms accounted 
for a small fraction of  total output, then the contribution of  FDI to a city’s 
growth will be proportional to the total FDI the city receives. I will refer to 
this as a “scale effect.” In other words, the presence of a scale effect signals 
the existence of positive spillover across firms in the same city.’O 
Similarly, exports can also enter regressions in two ways. Exporting firms 
can learn new ideas about marketing, design, or technology from interacting 
with buyers in the world market. If  the benefits of  learning are confined to 
those firms who actually do the exporting, then its contribution will be propor- 
tional to the share of exports in a city’s total output. On the hand, the newly 
10. The terminology of  intensity vs. scale effects is borrowed from Backus, Kehoe, and Kehoe 
(1992), who used it to represent the absence or presence of externality in human capital. 79  The Open Door Policy and  China’s Rapid Growth 
learned ideas are likely to travel to other firms that may not do any exporting 
at all. This transfer of  ideas can also be accomplished through dinner table 
conversations, or formal business meetings. Alternatively, nonexporting firms 
can simply imitate the management or marketing concepts exporting firms 
have demonstrated. As far as this spillover is concerned, the benefit of exports 
to the city is more closely related to the total exports of all the firms in the city 
collectively than to the share of exports in total industrial output. That is, one 
can also use the scale effect to detect the presence of positive spillover from ex- 
ports. 
The H,  variable captures the contribution of  human capital to growth, as 
emphasized by Lucas (1988) and others. If an educated person is counted pas- 
sively as one unit of  skilled labor, then the contribution of  skill workers is 
limited to their share in the total labor force. But as the theory emphasizes, 
there are tremendous positive externalities associated with human capital: I 
become more productive if my colleagues are more educated. Under this hy- 
pothesis, more scientists facilitate more and faster cross-fertilization of ideas. 
The contribution of  scientists or skilled workers is likely to be greater, the 
greater the absolute number of scientists or skilled workers in the city. 
It is important to point out that an increase in city k‘s exports, foreign invest- 
ment, or the other two variables may improve the entire nation’s productivity 
(cross-city spillover). But any such increase will simply be reflected in the 
intercept of  regressions, because it does not generate cross-city differences 
in growth. 
3.3  DataSets 
I employ two city-level data sets in this paper. The first has 434 cities for 
1988-90, and the second 74 cities for 1980-90 (China State Statistical Bureau 
1989,1990,1991). The first sample has a reasonably large number of observa- 
tions. Furthermore, many variables of interest, such as shares of private and 
foreign firms in total industrial output, have been systematically collected in 
this period. On the other hand, a shortcoming of the data set is its short time 
period, which makes it more likely to be dominated by cyclical factors. Indeed, 
the period is one of the low-growth stages in a generally fast-growing decade. 
The second sample covers essentially the entire reform period, which makes 
it ideal for examining the contribution of  the open door policy to Chinese 
growth in a systematic way. The results from this decade-long sample are less 
likely to be influenced by cyclical factors. However, the sample size is consid- 
erably smaller than in the first data set. Furthermore, data on many variables 
of  interest were not collected in the first half of  the  1980s. Even for those 
variables that were collected in 1980, there is a large number of missing values 
for many  cities, rendering the effective sample size much smaller than 74. 
Overall, one should not rely exclusively on either sample when drawing gen- 
eral lessons about Chinese growth. 80  Shang-Jin  Wei 
3.4  Regression Results from 434 Cities during 1988-90 
3.4.1  Initial Industrial Size and Population Growth 
In table 3.1, the coefficients on the level of  1988 output are negative al- 
though not statistically significant except for one. In other words, for this two- 
year sample, there is no evidence that a larger initial industrial scale of the city 
helps it to grow faster. 
The coefficient for the population growth rate is 0.60 and significant at the 
5 percent level. 
3.4.2  The Open Door Policy 
Exports and FDI are used as measures of the open door policy. The export 
variable enters the regressions in two ways: in absolute scale or as a percentage 
of  total output. If  exports and FDI are entered separately, both are positive 
(although only the scale of exports is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level). This is a finding often reported in some form in cross-country studies: 
openness correlates with high growth.'I Here, a 1 percent increase in the scale 
of exports is associated with a two-year growth rate higher by  2.5 percentage 
points. 
If the growth rate of exports is used as an explanatory variable, its estimated 
coefficient is 0.046 and is significant at the 10 percent level. Because of the 
possibility of reverse causality, I will not read too much into this result. 
We  next turn to the effect of FDI.  Ideally, we would like to use the stock of 
FDI, but the data are not available at the city level, so we  use flow data.'* 
Similar to the export variable, the FDI variable can enter the regression in one 
of two ways: in absolute scale (in U.S. dollars) or as a percentage of total fixed 
capital investment. 
If  the two measures of FDI are entered into the regression separately, only 
the absolute scale of FDI is significant. A 1 percent increase in the size of FDI 
is associated with a 1.3 percentage point higher growth rate for the two-year 
period. This lends some support to the notion of  an externality effect of FDI. 
Extra growth by  1.3 percentage points is not negligible, but neither is it over- 
whelming for Chinese cities. The growth rate of FDI over 1988-90,  when in- 
cluded as an explanatory variable, is not significant. 
Table 3.2 examines the effect of including measures of FDI and exports in 
the same regressions. If the absolute scales of both FDI  and exports enter the 
11. See Edwards (1989) and papers cited therein. 
12. The problem may not be fatal, for two reasons: First, there is probably a large serial correla- 
tion in the spatial pattern of FDIs. The simple correlation between FDI  in  1988 and in 1990 is 
0.64. Second, FDI in virtually every city started in the early or mid-1980s. The annual flows of 
FDI in earlier years were considerably smaller than in later years. Judged from national data, the 
1988 flow of FDI was slightly smaller than the combined FDIs of all previous years. 
I plan to construct stock data for a subset of cities based on their annual flow data and to reexam- 
ine some of the issues here in a subsequent analysis. 81  The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth 
Table 3.1  Exports, Foreign Investment, and  Industrial Growth, 1988-90 
LY88  -.043**  -.016  - 
.023  .011 
GPop  .598*  .604* 
.230  .23  1 
LExp88  .025** 
,015 







.  ,007  -  ,009  ,006 
,013  ,008  ,011 
,271  .618*  .274 






N  341  347  342 
SEE  .19  .I9  .19 







,142  341  124 
.13  .18  .13 
.07  .19  .06 
Notes:  Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
***Significant at the 15 percent level. 
regression, only FDI is statistically significant. If  one also adds the growth 
rates of FDI  and exports to the last regression, both the scale and growth rate 
of FDI are statistically significant, but neither measure of exports is. 
To  summarize, during 1988-90,  foreign investment contributed more to 
cross-city differences in industrial output than did exports. Furthermore, the 
scale effect of foreign investment is significant and supports the hypothesis of 
spillover of technological or managerial knowhow across firms within cities. 
3.4.3  Other Reform Policies 
One often-mentioned aspect of the Chinese reforms is the vitality of China’s 
nonstate sector.13  Here, we will quantify the contribution  of the nonstate sector 
to overall industrial growth, and will do so in connection with examining the 
open door policy. 
13. In the Chinese context, the nonstate sector is not exactly the same thing as a private sector. 
The majority  of  nonstate  firms are what  are called  collectively  owned enterprises.  They  are 
community-based firms, but the relevant local governments often have the power to appoint or 
dismiss managers. Among the collectively  owned firms, the TVEs have been developing particu- 
larly fast. 82  Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 3.2  Exports, Foreign Investment, and Industrial Growth, 1988-90:  FDI 
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Notes:  Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All 
regressions have an  intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
The first regression in table 3.3 includes as an explanatory variable the ratio 
of nonstate firms’ output to total output. Here the nonstate firms are defined as 
private firms, township and village enterprises (TVEs), and foreign-owned 
managed firms. Urban collective firms are excluded because no data are avail- 
able. We find this ratio to be positive and significant at the 1 percent level. A 1 
percent rise in the output share of the nonstate firms is associated with a 0.19 
percent higher growth rate. 
If we decompose the nonstate firms into private firms, TVEs, and foreign- 
ownedmanaged firms, we see an interesting pattern. Only TVEs and foreign 
firms have  made a positive contribution to overall city growth. A  1 percent 
increase in the output share of TVEs is associated with a 0.22 percent higher 
growth rate. Cities with a 1 percent higher share of foreign firms tend to grow 
0.55 percent more rapidly. Since the share of foreign-investedmanaged firms 
in total output circumvents the issue of stock versus flow of FDI, the relatively 
high contribution of the foreign firms may be a better testimony to the contribu- 
tion of the open door policy to Chinese growth. 
The share of private individual firms has a negative coefficient (it is insig- 
nificant when it enters the regression alone). The lack of a positive contribution 
by private firms is not intuitive. In search of an explanation, one may note that 
private firms in China are typically family-based small businesses (with fewer 
than eight employees) and were newly started during the reform years. The 83  The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth 
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*Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
regression result may  simply reflect a pervasive underreporting of  output by 
private firms in order to evade taxes. Indeed, it is possible that cities with 
better-performing TVEs and foreign firms find it financially less necessary to 
strictly enforce tax payment by their private firms. 
If  one adds the absolute scales of  exports and FDI to the above regres- 
sion, neither variable is statistically significant. The lack of  significance can 
be due to a high collinearity between the FDI and output share of  foreign 
firms. 
A second way to measure the extent of reform in a particular city is to look 
at its share of retail sales conducted on the free market. Before 1978, almost no 
retail sales were on the free market. The share of the free market has increased 
gradually as the reform deepens. The rate of increase is certainly uneven across 
the country. This variable can signal the initiative of city governments in push- 
ing  certain  reform  measures,  particularly  price  liberalization,  holding 
other things constant. Of course, other things are not constant. In particular, 84  Shang-Jin Wei 
different cities have different sized rural areas under their jurisdictions. For 
example, the  city  government of  Shanghai has  a jurisdiction  of  10  small 
surrounding counties, while the city governments in Sichuan control more 
and larger counties. To  the extent that  a significant portion of  free market 
trading is in  agricultural goods, the free market  share of  total retail sales 
may  not  give a precise measure of  reform initiatives related to  industrial 
production. We  have to take this into account in interpreting the regression 
results. 
In any case, when the free market share of total retail sales in  1988 is in- 
cluded in the regression, it actually has a negative sign (see table 3.4). In other 
words, we  cannot find a positive effect of  price liberalization on industrial 
growth as measured by the initial free market share. The growth in the share 
of the free market, when included as an explanatory variable, is positive and 
statistically significant. But the magnitude of  the contribution to overall city 
growth is modest: 1 percent higher growth of the free market is associated with 
0.09 percent higher industrial growth. 
A third way  to gauge the impact of  reform on city growth is to look for 
evidence of better growth performance by cities that have been granted greater 
authority to conduct localized reform experiments. 
In August  1980, the Beijing government declared four cities, Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen, “special economic zones” (SEZs).I4  In an SEZ, 
investment decisions are made largely outside the state plan. Special tax con- 
cessions and less restrictive regulations on foreign exchange and land use are 
adopted in order to attract foreign investment. For foreign-owneamanaged 
firms, there is a two-year tax holiday, followed by  another three years of low 
tax rate (7.5 percent). After the initial five years, foreign firms then pay a 15 
percent tax rate. In comparison, outside the SEZs, the tax rate is 33 percent for 
foreign firms and 55 percent for domestic state-owned firms. Encouraged by 
the rapid development in the four SEZs, the central government further de- 
clared in  1983 that the entire island province of  Hainan, close to the size of 
Taiwan, would be a “special area open to foreign investment” and, in  1988, 
made it the largest SEZ. 
In May  1984, the Beijing government announced that 14 cities spread along 
the entire Pacific coast had been granted “open coastal city” status. The ex- 
plicit purpose of this is also to attract foreign capital and technology. In con- 
trast to most of the SEZs, these cities all have an established industrial base and 
a well-educated labor force. With their new status, they can offer essentially all 
the preferential policies toward foreign investment of  an SEZ except for the 
special income tax rates. Typically, foreign-ownearnanaged  firms must pay 
tax at a rate of 24 percent, somewhere between the rates in an SEZ and those 
14. Shekou,  the part of Shenzhen close to Hong Kong, was declared an “industrial export zone” 
in January 1979. 85  The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth 
elsewhere in the country. Manufacturing firms, however, are taxed at a conces- 
sionary 15 percent rate.I5 
Starting in 1981, the central government (and provincial governments) has 
designated 72 cities “comprehensive reform experimenting cities.” The gov- 
ernments of these cities have gained more authority in managing firms inside 
the city boundaries, have greater access to the revenue originating in them, and 
can take over certain firms previously managed directly by the ministries in 
Beijing. Notice that the creation of this status largely entails bureaucratic de- 
centralization (i.e., a transfer of  some regulatory authority from the central 
government to the city governments) and hence does not automatically imply 
that more market-oriented reforms will be implemented in these cities. 
To estimate the effects of these localized reform experiments, I have con- 
structed three dummy variables. They are SEZ for the special economic zone, 
COAST for the fourteen coastal open cities, and RFM for the comprehensive 
reform experimenting cities. 
The results with the RFM dummy are in table 3.4, and those with SEZ and 
COAST in table 3.5. The coefficients for the RFM and SEZ dummies are not 
significant. This indicates that, at least during 1988-90,  there was no system- 
atic difference  in the growth performance for cities with or without those forms 
of special status from the central government. In contrast, the COAST dummy 
does have a positive and significant coefficient: a coastal open city on average 
grows faster than other cities by 9.2 percent over the two years. However, the 
dummy is no longer significant once scales of FDI and exports, or growth 
rates of the two, are included in the same regression. Among the newly added 
variables, only the scale of FDI or its growth rate are significant. This means 
that the entire above-the-norm growth rate in the coastal open cities is due to 
their ability to attract foreign investment. 
To summarize, cities with a larger share of the nonstate sectors tend to grow 
faster. The contribution of the nonstate sectors comes mainly from the TVEs 
and  particularly foreign-ownedmanaged firms. The coastal open cities do 
grow faster than the national average, primarily because of their superb record 
in attracting foreign investment. 
3.4.4  Human Capital 
Recent growth theories have stressed the importance of human capital for 
growth (Romer 1986; Lucas 1988). This section examines the contribution of 
15. Starting in the mid-1980s and accelerating after 1988, there have also been policies to open 
the entire Pacific Basin, particularly the Liaoning and Shandong peninsulas, the entire provinces 
of Guangdong and Fujian, and parts of Guangxi and Hebei provinces. Since April 1990, the Pu- 
dong New Area of  Shanghai, the largest city in China, has been developed into an “open economic 
zone” with preferential policies even broader in  scope than for an  SEZ. I have not attempted to 
formally incorporate these developments in the statistical work of this paper. For a survey of these 
developments, see Bell and N’guiamba (1993). 86  Shang-Jin Wei 
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Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistant standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
human capital to Chinese growth and asks whether this addition may change 
our earlier conclusions. Our choice of  variable for human capital is largely 
dictated by data availability. We  measure the stock of human capital by  what 
is called “scientific and technical personnel” in the Chinese source, both in 
absolute numbers (to examine the scale effect) and as a percentage of the non- 
agricultural population (to examine the intensity effect). 
It is important to point out that the definition of  “scientific and technical 
personnel” in the Chinese source is broad enough to include essentially all 
skilled workers. The ratio of scientific and technical personnel to the total labor 
force offers a more direct measure of  the average skill/education level of  the 
labor force than primary and secondary school enrollment, since there is a time 
lag between school enrollment and labor force entry. School enrollment is of- 
ten used as a measure of the average human capital level in cross-country stud- 
ies because the more direct measure is not available.16 
16. I thank  John Page for pointing out that the general educatiodskill level of the labor force is 
probably more important than the number of high-level scientists for a country’s economic devel- 
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Table 3.5  Coastal Areas and Industrial Growth, 1988-90 
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N  347  142  123  347  142  123 
SEE  .19  .13  .12  .19  .12  .I2 
Adjusted RZ  .17  .06  .16  .18  .14  .14 
Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
In the original data source, there is a separate variable, “mid or higher level 
scientific and technical personnel,” which is a subset of all “scientific and tech- 
nical personnel” with advanced training and sophisticated skills. I have also 
used this variable in the regressions and found essentially the same results. 
The statistical results are reported in table 3.6. Unfortunately, neither the 
scale nor intensity measure of human capital is statistically significant when 
included alone in the regression, and some even have a negative coefficient. 
When the growth of the number of  scientific personnel is included in the re- 
gression alone, it is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. A 1 percent 
increase in the growth rate of  scientific personnel is associated with a 0.06 
percent increase in  the industrial growth rate. However,  when  the scales of 
exports and FDI are included in the same regression, the growth rate of scien- 
tific personnel loses its statistical significance (at the 10 percent level). The 
scale of FDI is positive and significant at the 10 percent level. 
To  summarize, the scale or average level of human capital does not appear 
to  contribute to the cross-city differences in industrial growth rates during 
1988-90.  The contribution of the open door policy (in particular, that of for- 
eign investment) identified in earlier subsections is not altered. 88  Shang-Jin Wei 
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Notes:  Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
3.4.5  Robustness Checks 
In this section, I examine the robustness of the statistical results. To  ensure 
that the earlier results are not driven by a few outliers, I am prepared to err on 
the side of omitting too many observations. 
The mean growth rate for 1988-90  is 0.29. But the variation among the 
cities is enormous. Langfang and Ankong were growing at the rates of  217 
percent and 203 percent, respectively, while Jingzhou and Yunchen were grow- 
ing at  -36  percent and -29  percent. I will delete all observations that are 
outside a two standard deviation band from the mean. This criteria deletes eight 
supergrowing cities and the six slowest-growing ones. When all the regres- 
sions are redone on this restricted sample, the earlier results essentially have 
survived. In particular, the positive association between FDI and industrial 
growth  is  strengthened, while  the  weak  association between  exports  and 
growth becomes even weaker. 
Because in the main regressions the key regressor (FDI) is at its beginning- 
of-sample value, the problem of  simultaneous bias is probably not serious. 
Nevertheless, I have also tried to estimate a system of two simultaneous equa- 
tions for output growth and FDI, in which FDI is assumed to be a function of 
the trade-output ratio and reform dummies. The scale of FDI continues to have 
a significant and positive effect on industrial growth. 89  The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth 
3.5  Statistical Results for the 1980-90  Sample 
A few observations are eliminated because data errors are suspected. The 
data on  Nanchong is omitted because it records an extremely high export- 
output ratio (0.58) in 1980. Although the city is not known for its openness, 
the recorded ratio was the highest in the sample. Furthermore, the ratio is sub- 
stantially higher than the second highest (Weihai, 0.23) and is more than three 
standard deviations (0.09) away from the mean (0.08). 
The second group of omitted data are for Haikou, because it is the only city 
that is reported to have had a negative growth rate over 1980-90  in the absolute 
scale of exports. In spite of many news stories about how Haikou has become 
substantially more open than a decade ago, its reported total growth rate of 
exports is -29  percent over 1980-90. 
Shenzhen is omitted in all regressions because there are no data on its ex- 
ports in 1980. It is worth pointing out that Shenzhen is the fastest-growing city 
in the sample in terms of  its industrial output. Its 10-year growth rate over 
1980-90  is a phenomenal 545 percent, twice as high as the second highest 
growth rate in the sample,I7  and more than six standard deviations (0.61) above 
the mean (155 percent). As an SEZ, the city is known to have been extremely 
outward oriented. Had it been included in the sample, it would undoubtedly 
have reinforced any finding of  a positive contribution of  exports or foreign 
investment to city growth. 
We  would like to replicate all the key regressions performed on the other 
sample. Unfortunately, the data on FDI  and the ownership composition of in- 
dustrial output are not available for 1980. The corresponding data for 1990 are 
used as substitutes. As an admittedly weak justification for this, we note that 
those variables are likely to be serially correlated. The simple correlation of 
the scale of FDI between 1988 and 1990 is 0.64, and that of the share of FDI 
in total investment is 0.68. The correlations for the output shares of the private 
firms, TVEs, and foreign-invested firms between 1988 and 1990 are 0.74,0.94, 
and 0.62, respectively. 
Because of this substitution, one has to interpret the regression results with 
caution. In particular, the use of the end-of-sample values of  these variables 
tend  to  underestimate  their  contribution to  growth  (relative to  using  the 
beginning-of-sample values). For example, if the foreign firms grow faster than 
domestic firms, then cities that have a lot of  foreign firms also tend to grow 
faster. The end-of-sample share of  the foreign firms in total output will be 
larger than the beginning-of-period share, even if the number of foreign firms 
and other things are held constant. A larger end-of-sample share relative to the 
beginning-of-sample share is needed to explain the same growth rate. Hence, 
the resulting coefficient estimate will be smaller. 
17. The city with in second highest growth rate in the sample is Guiling, with a 10-year growth 
rate reaching 267 percent. 90  Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 3.7  Exports, Foreign Investment, and Industrial Growth,  1980-90 
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N  43  43  43  38  38 
SEE  .32  .32  .33  .32  .3  1 
AdjustedP  .I7  .17  .12  .20  .23 
Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
On the other hand, with this substitution, the possibility of reverse causality 
is also more serious. Imagine that the initial size of FBI has nothing to do with 
growth, but that new FDI always goes to cities that grow rapidly. By the end 
of the sample, fast-growing cities may have more FDI. Hence, this can produce 
a correlation between FDI and growth. For whatever they are worth, regres- 
sions similar to those for the 1988-90  sample have been run. 
3.5.1  Initial Size of the Industrial Sector 
From tables 3.7 and 3.8, one may notice a somewhat surprising result. The 
coefficient on the level of  1980 output is negative and statistically significant, 
suggesting a tendency to convergence in growth rates in Chinese cities. One 
percent higher 1980 output tends to be associated with a reduction of the 10- 
year total growth rate by 24 percentage points (or of the annual growth rate by 
2.4 percentage points). Notice that the convergence result would also have been 
strengthened if Shenzhen and Haikou were included in the regression, because 
they both started with a small industrial base but enjoyed phenomenal growth. 
The negative coefficient suggests that increasing returns to scale is not oper- 
ative at the city level in China. This need not be puzzling if one recognizes that 
much of  the industrial sector in prereform China was extremely inefficient, 
burdened with obsolete technology, inadequate management, and poor worker 91  The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth 
Table 3.8  Exports, Foreign Investment, and Industrial Growth, 1980-90: FDI 
and Exports Together 
Variable  (1)  (2) 
LY80  -.302*  -.351* 
,137  .I47 
GPop  .504**  .238 
.305  ,336 
LExp80  .154  .217* 
.I02  ,105 
GExP  ,187 
,117 
LFDI90  .023  .004 
.028  ,025 
N  38  38 
See  .31  .3  1 
Adjusted R2  .23  .25 
Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
discipline. Furthermore, in  selecting cities to experiment with reform meas- 
ures, particularly in the early 1980s, the Chinese government was often system- 
atically biased against large industrial cities for fear of  losing control of the 
state-owned sector. This can lead to a negative association between initial size 
and subsequent growth. 
3.5.2  Exports and FDI: Scale versus Intensity Effects 
The first set of results is in table 3.7. As expected, the growth rate of the 
nonagricultural population has a positive impact on growth rates. The coeffi- 
cient on population growth is about 0.55, which is close to the corresponding 
estimate for the 1988-90  sample (0.60). 
The scale of exports in logarithm, when included as an independent  variable, 
has an estimated coefficient of 0.16, which is significant at the 5 percent level. 
A  1 percent increase in the scale of exports of  a city is associated with a 16 
percentage point increase in its 10-year growth rate. 
If the ratio of exports to output is included in the regression, a much larger 
estimate is obtained. A 1 percent increase in this ratio is associated with a 2.17 
percent higher growth rate. If  the growth rate of  exports over the decade is 
used as an independent variable, it is not significant. 
Foreign direct investment again can enter the regressions in two ways. In 
terms of the scale effect of  foreign investment, the coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level. A 1 percent increase in the absolute scale of 92  Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 3.9 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the  10 percent level. 
FDI is associated with a rise in the  10-year growth rate by  4.8 percentage 
points. There is a positive intensity effect as well. A 1 percent increase in the 
FDI-output ratio is associated with a rise in the city's  growth rate by  2.14 
percent. 
If  we  include both the levels of  exports and FDI,  and the growth rate of 
exports in the regression (table 3.8), only the scale of exports is significant at 
the 5 percent level. IJnlike the 1988-90  sample, the contribution of  exports 
appears more important than that of FDI for the decade. Furthermore, the scale 
effect of exports suggest that the contribution of exports is also through some 
positive spillover. 
3.5.3  Contribution of Other Reforms 
As with the sample over  1988-90,  we  measure the impact of  reforms in 
three ways: (1)  the role of the nonstate sectors, in particular, TVEs and foreign 
firms, (2) the ratio of  free market sales to total retail sales, and (3) dummies 
indicating enhanced authority that cities have received from the central govern- 
ment to experiment with more reforms. 
In table 3.9, the estimated coefficient on the nonstate sector is positive and 93  The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth 
Table 3.10  Reform Experiments  and Industrial Growth, 1980-90 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
statistically significant: A 1 percent increase in the share of the nonstate sector 
in total output is associated with  an increase of  1.3 percent in the  10-year 
growth rate. 
If we decompose the nonstate sector into private ,individual firms, TVEs, 
and foreign-invested firms, we observe a result similar to the other sample: the 
shares of TVEs and foreign firms in total output have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on the growth rate. A  1 percent higher share of TVEs is 
associated with a 1.36 percent higher growth rate. A 1 percent higher share of 
foreign-investedmanaged  firms  is  associated  with  a  2.07  percent  higher 
growth rate. The scale of FDI  and the growth rate of exports, when added to 
the above regression, are not significant. 
Second, the share of the free market in the city’s total retail sales is used as 
a  proxy  for price liberalization and  related reforms  (table 3.10). Because 
no such data are available for  1980, the  1990 data are used. Similar to the 
other sample, this ratio is not significant (and the point estimate is even nega- 
tive). 
Third, the dummies COAST and RFM  are added as regressors (table 3.11). 
The SEZ dummy is not added because there are some missing values for each 
of the special economic zones. The COAST dummy is positive and significant 
when added alone to the regression. That is, the 14 coastal open cities do grow 
faster than the national average. However, when the scales of exports and FDI 94  Shang-Jin Wei 
Table 3.11  Coastal Areas and Industrial Growth, 1980-90 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3) 
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Adjusted R2  .I4  .21  .23 
Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
are added, COAST is no longer significant. At the same time, the scale of 
exports is significant. This suggests that, over 1980-90,  the extra growth rate 
that the coastal cities enjoyed was largely due to their above-average export 
performance. (In comparison, during the last two years of the 1980s, the extra 
growth is more likely explained by  the above-average FDI presence in these 
cities.) 
3.5.4  Human Capital 
As a measure of human capital, the number of (broadly defined) “scientific 
and technical personnel” and the ratio this number to the total population are 
included separately in the regressions.’*  As can be seen from table 3.12, neither 
measure is positive, contrary to what the human capital strand of new growth 
theory would have suggested (one estimate is even negative and significant). 
However, when the growth in scientific personnel is used as a regressor, it turns 
out to be positive and significant. Note that, because there are only 17 cities 
that have data on the number of scientists in 1980, these estimates should be 
treated with caution. 
18. As in the 1988-90  sample, “scientific and technical personnel” is defined broadly enough 
to encompass essentially all skilled workers, not just high-level scientists and technicians. 95  The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth 
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Notes: Numbers below coefficient estimates are heteroscedasticity-consistent  standard errors. All 
regressions have an intercept which is not reported. 
*Significant  at the 5 percent level. 
**Significant at the 10 percent level. 
3.6  Conclusion 
Using two city-level data sets, this paper has examined the contribution of 
the open door policy to Chinese growth. There is clear evidence that during 
1980-90 more exports were positively associated with higher industrial growth 
across the cities. In comparison, in the late 1980s, the cross-city growth differ- 
ences are explained by foreign investment rather than by exports. The contribu- 
tion of foreign investment comes in the form of  technological or managerial 
spillover across firms, as opposed to the infusion of new capital. 
Cities with a larger share of  nonstate sectors grow faster. The contribution 
of the nonstate sectors comes mainly from the TVEs, and particularly foreign- 
investedmanaged  firms. The coastal cities do grow faster than the national 
average, but the extra growth comes almost entirely from their ability to attract 
more foreign investment. To the extent that inland areas can also attract foreign 
investment and export via coastal cities, they also benefit from the open door 
Finally,  it  is  important  to  point  out  that  the  contribution  of  the  open 
door policy to Chinese growth is likely to be underestimated. As noted earlier, 
policy. 96  Shang-Jin Wei 
much  of  the benefit  of  export  expansion or a foreign investment boom  in 
one city may  spill over to other cities. The portion of growth that is gener- 
ated by  the cross-city spillover is reflected only in the intercept of  the kind 
of  regressions  reported  in  this  paper.  Even  though  the  open  door  policy 
may  substantially  raise overall Chinese growth, this may not be picked up 
by  the coefficient estimates for city-level foreign investment or export var- 
iable~.’~ 
Appendix 
Definition of  Variables in the Regressions 
All data refer to cities and surrounding counties in their jurisdiction. 
Y = gross value of industrial output 
Pop = nonagricultural population 
Exp = purchase for exports in RMB yuan 
FDI = foreign direct investment in U.S. dollars 
IV = total fixed capital investment by all ownership types 
RFDI = FDI/IV 
RYIND = share of individuauprivate firms in total industrial output 
RYTVE = share of TVEs in total industrial output 
RYFOR = share of foreign-ownedmanaged  firms in total industrial output 
RYNS = share of private firms, TVEs, and foreign-ownedmanaged firms in 
RMKT = share of free market in total retail sales 
SCNT = scientific and technical personnel 
MHSCNT = middle or higher levels of scientific and technical personnel 
SEZ = dummy for four special economic zones 
COAST = dummy for 14 coastal open cities. 
RFM = dummy for 72 “comprehensive reform experimenting cities” 
total city industrial output 
G and L prefixes to a variable denote, respectively, the growth rate and loga- 
rithmic value of that variable. 
19. One channel through which cross-city spillover takes place is labor (and manager) move- 
ment across cities. So far, this channel is only marginally operative. Intercity job mobility has 
changed from virtually zero in prereform years to a small positive number in the  1980s. The 
diminished and eventually abolished use of food coupons in the 1980s has facilitated this increase 
in mobility. But the household registration system still in place, the underdevelopment of housing 
markets, and the social safety net continue to impede labor mobility across cities (Davis 1992). 97  The Open Door Policy and China’s Rapid Growth 
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Comment  Yun-Wing Sung 
This paper has skillfully utilized city-level data to analyze the very important 
question of the contribution of exports and foreign investment to the phenome- 
nal industrial growth in China. Analysis of the very successful growth of China 
is difficult because the reform period has been relatively short and quarterly 
data is mostly unavailable. Fortunately for economists, China is a land of  vast 
regional variations, and the sample size of  a regional data set can be quite 
large. Regional studies of  the Chinese economy are becoming fashionable 
partly because of flourishing powerful regional economies, and partly because 
of rich data. 
Wei uses two city-level data sets: The first has 434 cities for 1988-90,  and 
the second has 74 cities for 1980-90.  It is found that, during 1980-90,  more 
exports are positively  associated with higher growth  rates  across Chinese 
cities. In the late 198Os, the contribution to growth comes mainly from foreign 
investment. Furthermore, the contribution of foreign investment comes in the 
form of technological or managerial spillovers across firms, as opposed to an 
infusion of new capital. 
While I agree with the main points of the paper, there are some weaknesses. 
First, the author should give more prominence to the problem of reverse causal- 
ity. While the author noted that reverse causality can be a problem when he 
substituted 1990 end-of-sample values for some variables (foreign direct in- 
vestment and ownership composition), he should warn the reader that reverse 
causality is a general problem since the paper does not use simultaneous equa- 
tion estimation. The positive association between industrial growth on the one 
hand, and exports and foreign direct investment on the other, may be accounted 
for by a positive impact of  industrial growth on exports and direct foreign in- 
vestment. 
Second, the term “city” or shi in China refers to a jurisdictional and adminis- 
trative unit which may be largely rural, though populous cities such as Shang- 
hai and Beijing contain substantial urban areas. The fact that cities are adminis- 
trative units means that they can be amalgamated or split for administrative 
reasons. For example, the jurisdiction zones of many Chinese cities were sub- 
stantially enlarged in 1983, with the result that the proportion of the Chinese 
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population living in “cities” and “towns” (shizhen zongrenkou) rose from 20 
percent in 1981 to 32 percent in 1984, and rose further to 50 percent in 1988. 
The 1983 enlargement of  the jurisdiction zones of  many Chinese cities has 
obviously affected the 1980-90  sample, probably substantially. 
In China’s city-level data sets, data for urban areas are often reported sepa- 
rately from data for the whole administrative district, and so data for the urban 
area should be reasonably free from the problem of  enlargement in jurisdic- 
tion. Unfortunately, city-level trade data are only reported for the administra- 
tive districts, and regressions involving exports cannot be free from the prob- 
lem of changes in jurisdiction. For foreign investment, industrial growth, and 
other variables, the author did not specify whether the data refer to the entire 
city or to the urban area only. He seems to have  swept these problems under 
the rug. 
Third, the second sample of 74 cities contains primarily the more populous 
cities with large urban areas, whereas the first sample of 434 cities contains 
largely less populous cities with small urban areas and large rural populations. 
This difference may be important for the contributions of exports and foreign 
direct investment to industrial growth. If Robert Lucas is correct in his assess- 
ment that spillover benefits are particularly important in urban areas due to the 
ease of communication, spillover effects should be more prominent in the sec- 
ond sample than in the first. 
The difference in the two samples may also be important for exports at the 
city level. In the Chinese system of foreign trade, exports of a city usually refer 
to exports of  the foreign trade corporations of  that city. These include both 
goods made in that city and goods made elsewhere purchased by  the foreign 
trade corporations of that city for export. The goods of less populous cities are 
usually sold to foreign trade corporations in large urban areas, especially large 
ports, for export and are thus regarded as exports of the large cities instead of 
the small cities of  origin. This implies that exports will be prominent in the 
second sample, which is dominated by large, populous cities, whereas exports 
will be relatively unimportant in the first sample. This may  account for the 
empirical finding in the paper that exports do not contribute to growth in the 
first sample, though exports are highly significant for growth in the second 
sample. 
The rerouting of  exports to other cities will cause strange fluctuations in 
exports. For instance, it is noted in the paper that Haikou’s exports decreased 
by  29 percent from 1980 to  1990 despite the fact that Haikou has become 
substantially more open during the decade. This can probably be attributed to 
rerouting of exports to other cities. 
Finally, there are some loose ends. In the text covering the regressions in 
table 3.4, it is mentioned that growth in the share of the free market is a statisti- 
cally significant variable for explaining industrial growth, but the results are 
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Despite the above shortcomings, the paper is undoubtedly an important 
work  in the rapidly growing literature on empirical studies of  the Chinese 
economy relying on regional data. 
COlIMIlent  John Page 
China’s  extraordinary growth since undertaking its program of  gradual eco- 
nomic reform arguably places it among the other East Asian “superstars.” In 
two important respects-the  rapid growth of  manufactured exports and the 
significant role of  direct foreign investment (DF1)-China  in the 1980s and 
1990s share common characteristics with other rapidly growing East Asian 
economies. The importance of export growth and DFI in engendering the East 
Asian Miracle has become a subject of intense, and frequently polemical, de- 
bate.’ Thus, further work which helps to enlighten us on the contribution of 
these factors to growth and on the mechanisms by which they may carry out 
their growth-augmenting  role is especially welcome. Because much of the aca- 
demic debate on the role of exports and DFI has been argued in the context of 
cross-country growth regressions, it is also very useful to have a country study 
in which cross-sectional, time-series data are used to test a number of  hypothe- 
ses concerning the contribution of exports and foreign investment to growth at 
the subnational level. In these two respects Wei’s paper is an important addition 
to a literature which in general has been long on theory and argumentation and 
short on serious empirical analysis. 
The debate over growth in East Asia centers on the sources of  its rapid in- 
crease in per capita incomes. A “growth fundamentalist” school emphasizes 
the significance of  East Asia’s  unusually high rates of  physical and human 
capital deepening; while “growth mystics” tend to stress the importance of 
total factor productivity (TFP) change.2 Wei  clearly leans toward the mystic 
camp. His empirical results lead him to conclude that both exports and DFI 
increase growth rates in per capita income across cities in China through the 
impact of learning and competition on productivity change, rather than through 
increased rates of accumulation. A central question, then, is whether, given the 
limitations of  the data, the empirical results support such a view unambigu- 
ously. 
John Page is chief economist of the Middle East and North Africa Region of the  World Bank. 
1. See, e.g., Young (1993). Rodrik (1994). and the exchange between Pack and Page (1994) and 
2. For an exposition of these quasi-religious views and an attempt to assess their validity see 
Young  (1 994). 
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The Analytical Underpinnings 
Any  concise paper inevitably must select among the arguments and evi- 
dence to be presented. Wei chooses to place emphasis on the description of 
China’s economic reforms of the 1980s and gives rather short shrift to analyti- 
cal discussion of  the possible channels by  which either exports or DFI may 
enhance productivity change. The absence of an explicit analytical framework 
and/or review of other literature relating export performance to productivity 
change leaves Wei open to the frequently heard criticism that the causality in 
his regressions may run from the dependent to the independent variable. 
This is most frequently argued in the case of exports. Is it not equally plausi- 
ble that rapid productivity growth due to some, perhaps unmeasured, factor 
results in increasing price competitiveness of tradable goods and improved ex- 
port performance? But a similar case could be made for DFI. Rapid growth in 
income per capita may make cities more attractive as destinations for DFI. This 
uncertainty is compounded by the fact that in the interpretation empirical re- 
sults Wei identifies the productivity-enhancing  role of both variables with their 
absolute size, the “scale effect.” I am sympathetic to the implicit model which 
underlies Wei’s specification of the causal relationship, but in the absence of a 
more thorough discussion of the mechanisms by which exports-as  opposed, 
say, to outward orientation, the impact of both imports and exports-or  FDI 
enhance learning and productivity growth, I suspect that the skeptics will re- 
main unc~nvinced.~ 
The lack of precision in specifying the mechanisms by which exports and 
DFI enhance productivity growth is reflected also in the interpretation of the 
alternative definitions of  the two variables. Wei  defines both his export and 
DFI variables in relative (share of output or investment) and absolute terms. 
The former he calls the “intensity effect” and the latter the “scale effect.” He 
further associates only the scale effect with spillovers; the larger the absolute 
size of the variable, the greater the potential spillover. The rationale for this 
distinction is not entirely clear from the discussion in the paper. 
Consider the case of DFI. If  learning outside the foreign firm takes place by 
means of spillovers, why should these occur as a “constant fraction of the bene- 
fits . . . that foreign-invested firms obtain”? Why should they not be equally 
related to the probability that the new investment activity observed by  an in- 
cumbent domestic firm will be of foreign origin? The first interpretation argues 
in favor of the absolute variable; the second in favor of the relative measure. 
Similarly for exports, if  a high proportion of a city’s output is concentrated in 
exports, does this not increase the probability that nonexporting firms will ob- 
serve and learn from exporters? Without greater precision with respect to the 
means by which both within-firm learning and spillovers are realized, the case 
3. For a discussion of  the mechanisms by which exports may increase TFP  growth rates at the 
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for preferring the absolute to the relative definition of  the variable is not as 
clear-cut as Wei’s exposition would suggest. 
A second analytical problem derives from a data problem. Wei notes that 
the city-level data he employs lacks estimates of  the capital stock. Thus, he 
defines the production function in natural units of labor only and proceeds to 
interpret the residual of  output growth net  of  labor’s contribution as TFP 
growth. Wei is frank about the limitations imposed by such an assumption, but 
he is perhaps insufficiently cautious in interpreting his results. He has in effect 
specified a “Barro-type” cross-city regression without specifically using the 
concept of the endogenity of the capital stock. Moreover, because human capi- 
tal enters his regressions in a rather ad hoc manner as one of  the factors “ex- 
plaining” productivity change, it is not clear on what basis the investment rate 
is omitted from the regression. 
While Wei’s discussion of his data leaves unclear whether total investment 
and the investment share in output are available, the fact that he can construct 
a variable which gives the share of  DFI in total investment at the city level 
suggests that they are. If this is the case, a cross-city regression including the 
share of investment in output would place Wei’s specification more squarely in 
the mainstream of  the literature on cross-country growth regressions, would 
permit comparison with  other work, and perhaps most  significantly would 
bolster his arguments concerning the productivity-enhancing role of exports 
and DFI. 
Without some attempt to control for differences in the rate of capital accu- 
mulation, the results remain open to the criticism that the export and (espe- 
cially) the DFI variables-particularly  when they are measured in absolute 
terms-reflect  differences in rates of  accumulation. In its simplest form the 
argument would run as follows: because DFI is an important component of 
total investment, cities with high levels or rates of  growth of  DFI have high 
total investment. Output per person increases as a consequence of capital deep- 
ening for which the DFI variable is a proxy, not as a consequence of  more 
rapid productivity growth. 
The Role of Human Capital 
Wei’s results are disappointing for those observers of the East Asian Miracle 
who stress the role of human ~apital.~  His human capital variable consistently 
fails to explain variations in growth of output per person across cities. One 
problem may  be definitional. In cross-country regressions, levels of  educa- 
tional attainment appear to be a more satisfactory definition of human capital 
than skill categories such as “scientific and technical personnel.” In the cross- 
city context, however, there may be little variance in education stocks and the 
available variable relates to a broad definition of  skilled labor, hence Wei’s 
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choice. But, some discussion of  the cross-city variation in education stocks 
would have been welcome to buttress the choice of the skill variable. 
A second problem may be conceptual. If, as Wei argues, the principal impact 
of exports and DFI on growth is through increased mastery of technology and 
productivity change, human capital may interact with these variables to accel- 
erate growth. Thus, some attempt to explore interactions between skill levels 
and the other two variables should be attempted, as well as tests of their joint 
significance in explaining variations in per capita output growth. 
The results may, however, continue to disappoint. A least one strand of hu- 
man capital interpretations of success in Asia (Birdsall and Sabot 1993) em- 
phasizes that it is high cognitive skills in the bottom-end (“low-skill”) segment 
of the labor force which permits the East Asian high performers to adopt and 
master international best-practice technologies more effectively. According to 
that view, the interaction between exports, DFI, and human capital might best 
be captured by using measures of educational attainment in the bottom end of 
the wage distribution. This proposition cannot be tested with the data available 
to Wei, but it suggests a fruitful area for future, microeconomic research. 
The Lessons 
Academic readers looking for a definitive resolution of the fundamentalist- 
mystic debate on the origins of rapid growth in China will be disappointed. 
Wei’s results are consistent with the view that TFP  growth caused by DFI and 
rapid export expansion was a major engine of growth in China’s coastal cities. 
But the data limitations and the absence of a tight analytical link between ex- 
port expansion and productivity change will fail to persuade fundamentalist 
skeptics. Problems with the definition and interpretation of the human capital 
variable lead to similar problems in presenting a definitive view of its role in 
China’s success. 
In a broader sense, however, Wei’s  results contain important messages for 
policymakers in other developing economies. Economic liberalization is work- 
ing in China. Regardless of the precise channel through which it takes place, 
the net impact of a set of reforms favoring export expansion and DFI has been 
to increase the growth of per capita income. These results, despite the quibbles, 
are robust and point out the policy directions for other economies embarking 
on programs of economic liberalization. 
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